Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Semantic facts, philosophy: whether semantic facts are accepted within a theory depends on the orientation of this theory. That is, it depends on whether the theory is concerned with the use of language or with a more or less physical description of external objects. In the latter case, semantic facts should not be decisive. See also facts, truth maker, semantics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Semantic Facts - Dictionary of Arguments
II 130 Truth/foreign language/multilingual/Field: problem: whether a foreign utterance is true depends on semantic facts, but whether a sentence of one's native language is true, does not depend on it. Reason: because we must regard it then as "is synonymous with the corresponding sentence of their own language". II 130 Semantic fact/Field/(s): E.g. "the senence S is synonymous with the sentence P". >Translation, >Synonymy, >Meaning._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Semantic Facts
